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LEGAL LIABILITY FOR WAR DAMAGE*
John Hanna,

T

HIS article considers some of the rules for determining liability
for economic loss in respect of war claims, especially as applied in
connection with claims of life insurance companies for loss of premiums,
of insurers of property for war risk insurance premiums, of property
insurers for sums paid to foreign policyholders on war losses, and of
owners seeking to recover for loss of expected profits. The rules discussed are broadly applicable to international claims in general.
While international liability may be imposed irrespective of causation, as when Germany was made liable by the Treaty of Versailles for
the acts of its allies on the analogy of liability under the rules of
respondeat superior in private law, most questions of liability are approached from the standpoint of causation. This introduces the perplexing question of proximate cause,1 or to use the term preferred by
some writers,2 "legal" cause. Actual cause and proof thereof must be
segregated from proximate cause. The former is largely a question of

* This article is a chapter in a book on War Claims written by the author at the
request of the Foreign Property Holders' Protective Committee, Inc. of the National
Foreign Trade Council, Inc. It is printed by permission of the committee but in
advance of the committee's approval of the manuscript. My thanks are due to my
assistant, Franz Fraenkel, Ph.D., Dr. Jur., Marburg; LL.B., Columbia; especially for
the digests of decisions of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals.
Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
1
One of the most helpful discussions of proximate cause, not only because of its
merits, but because of its summary of the viewpoints of other writers, is Carpenter,
"Proximate Cause," 14 So. C1L. L. REv. 1,115,416 (1940-41); 15 id. 187, 304,
427 (1941-42); 16 id. 1, 61, 275 (1942-43). See also Beale, "The Proximate Consequences of an Act," 33 HARV. L. REv. 633 (1920); Bohlen, "The Probable or the
Actual Consequence as a Test of Liability in Negligence," 40 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 79,
148 (1901); Carpenter, "Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause," 20
CAL. L. REv. 229, 396, 471 (1932); Edgerton, "Legal Cause," 72 Umv. PA. L.
REV. 21 I, 343 ( I 934) ; Green, "Are There Dependable Rules of Causation?" 77
UNiv. PA. L. REV. 601 (1929); Gregory, "Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreat from 'Rationalization,'" 6 Umv. CHI. L. REv. 36· (1938); McLaughlin, "Proximate Cause,'' 39 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1925); Morris, "On the Teaching of Legal
Cause," 39 CoL. L. REv. 1087 (1939); Smith, "Legal Cause in Actions of Tort,''
25 HARV. L. REv. 103, 223, 303 (1911); Terry, "Proximate Consequences in the
Law of Torts,'' 28 HARV. L. REV. IO (1914); McCORMICK, DAMAGES 97, 266
(1935). See also Personnaz, La Reparation du Prejudice en Doit International Public,
Thesis University of Paris, 142 (1938).
2
See, for example, Edgerton, "Legal Cause," 72 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 211, 343
(1934).
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fact and precedents, and rules are of little use in its determination.
The ''but for" test, however, is the most useful aid in ascertaining actual cause.8 The defendant's act is not a cause if the injury would have
happened without it. Cause in facf may exist although there is no
proximate or legal cause. In contract law, liability is limited to foreseeable consequences. In tort law, generally there is a proximate cause
if there is no intervening cause between the act and its consequences.
When there are intervening causes and these are foreseeable, most .
. American cases decide there is proximate cause and intervening causes
are to be distinguished from existing conditions. Foreseeability may
be a requisite for liability in respect of the former, but not of the latter.
It should be observed, however, that numerous writers have rejected
the test of foreseeability and have attempted to substitute such tests as
"substantial factor," "normal" and "extraordinary," as applied to the
intervening cause.
One great difficulty in formulating American rules of liability in
tort is that while cause is a question of fact a:qd proximateness a question of law, the actual finding of a jury generally will not be disturbed
if the judge has given a proper charge. The result is that what are
called rules of proximate cause as illustrated by the decisions often are
not rules of la,w but jury determinations.
Proximate cause in reality is a matter of rules of policy·r~ther than
causation. Recovery may be denied not because there is any doubt as
to causation in a particular case, but because a recovery in the type of
case would invite fraudulent claims. In other cases, carrying causation to a logical conclusion would lead to a multiplicity of claims which
would be unfair to those regarded as having more substantial demands
in the event of limited assets. While the legal situation after World
War II may be affected by the Briand-Kellog~ Pact according to which
the making of war by Germany was itself illegal, that will not obviate
the question of the extent to which remote consequences are considered
in· the computation of damage. Those intrusted with responsibility for
Carpenter, ''Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause,"· 20· CAL. L.
REv. 229, 396, 471 (1932), Professor Beale's rules of liability are as follows:
"1. The defendant must have acted (or failed to act in violation of a duty).
"2. The force thus created must (a) have remained active itself or created another
force which remained active until it directly caused the result; or (b) have created
a new active risk of being acted upon by the active force that caused the result."
33 HARV. L. REv. 633 at 658 (1920).
TORTS RESTATEMENT makes "substantial factor" a condition precedent of legal
cause, TORTS RESTATEMENT, § 431 et. seq. See especially § 441, et. seq. on intervening
force.
·
3

J
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drafting agreements relating to international claims, would be well
advised to eliminate so far as possible problems of proximate cause
from determination by international tribunals by stating specific rules
for the limitation of liabilities for consequential economic loss. 4 While
it is too much to expect that such an advance formulation would cover
all the situations that might arise, it should be possible at least to deal
with the matters that have been the subject of controversy in the past. 5
4

See III WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, 1765 (1943).
The Commission on Indemnities appointed to consider the compensation to be
asked from China for damage due to the Boxer troubles of 1900 draw up a series of
recommendations regarding claims. While it might be thought that the items regarding
broken contracts and non-execution of contracts (see below) introduced an unfortunate
element of speculative damage, the Commission's opinion contains valuable suggestions
for the draftsmen of post-war settlement.
The following are the lists which are regarded as of direct and indirect damages:
"III (I) The commission considers that the cases specified below constitute an
immediate and direct consequence of the events of 1900.
"To governments:
"A. War expenditure, which includes indemnities for members of the legation
guard who were killed, wounded, or were subjected to cruel treatment.
"(The commission on indemnities has not been empowered to deal with the
above).
"B. Buildings of legations and consulates destroyed or damaged, taking into account new requirements, being an immediate and direct consequence of the above
events, in:lusive of temporary housing and repairs, expert survey for determining the
amount of damages, etc.
"Furniture and all property belonging to the Government.
"Furniture and private property belonging to the staff of the legations and consulates.
·
"To societies, companies, and private individuals:
"A. Societies and C,:mpanies.-Buildings and other property which have been
destroyed or damaged belonging to societies and companies in Peking, Tientsin, or
elsewhere, including temforary housing and repairs, expert surveys for determining
amount of damages, etc.
"B. Industrial undert6HngJ. -Direct losses suffered by industrial undertakings,
works commenced, wasted, or susr~nded.
"C. Merclumts.-Private prorerty of merchants.
"Real estate destroyed or damaged, including temporary housing and repairs,
expert surveys for determining amount of damages, etc.
"Furniture.
·
"Usual and inevitable salary of employees whose services could not be turned to
account.
"Unavoidable office expenses not made good in consequence of the events. Stock
in trade, goods, provisions, samples possessing pecuniary value, destroyed or deteriorated.
"Extraordinary cost of storage and reshipment.
"Debts \ecognized as valid which can no longer be recovered.
"Bank notes lost or which can not be cashed.
"Specie, bills payable at sight.
"Broken contracts of all descriptions, losses suffered in consequences of the non5

•
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The basic principle is that the allowance of damages should be reasonable in the circumstances. Such a principle is obviously vague and
difficult of application. One consideration is the injustice of putting
execution of contracts entered into for articles of exportation or importation.
"Deposits of money in telegraph offices or in banks. Advances to Chinese merchants who have become insolvent in consequence of the events.
"Extraordinary cost of insurance rendered necessary by the events referred to.
"Goods requisitioned for foreign troops for defensive works.
"D. Private individuals.-Real estate destroyed or damaged.
"Broken contracts of every description, losses through non-execution of contracts.
"Articles destroyed or disappeared in consequence of the troubles.
_
"Furniture, personal effects, jewelry, specie, bank notes which cannot be cashed,
objets d'art, pictures, photographs and family portraits only if of artistic value, knicknacks, books, collectiops memoires and letters and documents ( calculated according to
their salable value), manuscripts and materials collected for the publication of books
(conditionally on the real value being proved), plans and instruments, provisions, wines,
animals, and various materials.
"Articles destroyed or lost in pawn shops, deduction being made of advances
received on such articles.
"Rents not recoverable or rents paid in advance, where occupation was prevented
in consequence of the events.
"Deposits of money in telegraph offices or in banks.
"Journeys- to the nearest place of safety.
"Wounds or cruel treatments entailing the death of the breadwinner, incapacity
for work, or direct loss of money.
"To Chinese in the service of foreigners:
"Indemnities to Chinese who have suffered in their property or persons in consequence of their being in service of foreigners, including indemnities to the widows and
orphans of Chinese who have lost their lives during the course of recent events by
reason of their being in the service of foreigners.
"(II) The commission considers that the cases specified below ought not to be
considered as an immediate and direct consequence of the events of I 900.
"To merchants:
"Losses of earnings resulting from the interruption of business or from the disturbed state of commerce at Peking, Tientsin, and elsewhere.
"Bills payable at deferred sight of a risky character.
"Goods belonging to Chinese intended for export on their way from the interior
with transit passes.
"Telegrams, insurance charges and other ordinary expenses of this nature.
"Interest on goods in stock.
"Loss of interest on exchange contracts with banks.
"Goods in transit belonging to Chinese.
"Increased freight charges except in the case of contracts entered into before the
eyents.
"Commission to be earned on future contracts.
"Depreciation of value on millinery and similar articles.
"Fluctuation of exchange.
"Ordinary insurance of goods sold but not delivered.
"Losses caused by the interruption of banking operations during the trouble.
"Remuneration to employees to compensate them for suffering undergone.
"Hotel guests who have failed to pay their bills.

•
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upon the defendant the obligation of satisfying claims for indirect,
remote and consequential losses. A tribunal cannot be expected to
speculate along a trail of events into future uncertainties. A second
and perhaps a more important factor• is that when the defendant's
assets are limited, those who have suffered direct and admitted damage, in fairness can de111and priority over those whose damage is more
remote. Likewise, it is inequitable to enhance the damage of persons
claiming both direct and indirect loss and thus increase their proportion
of the total for distribution at the expense of those whose damage is
only direct.
LIFE INSURANCE CLAIMS

American life insurance companies presented claims through the
American Agent to the Mixed Claims Commission, United States and
Germany, which were typified by the cases alleging loss on account of
payments on policies on the lives of certain passengers killed on the
Lusitania. The chief basis for the claims was that the extraordinary
hazard of death to noncombatant neutrals through unlawful acts of
belligerents had not been provided for by the premiums received and
did not come within the law of averages upon which life insurance is
predicted. The companies contended that they suffered a property
loss through the diminution in the normal amount of premiums they
would have received and through the corresponding decrease of their
reserves. It was conceded that the death of an insured within the as"Loss of customers generally.
"Value of sites the buildings on which have been destroyed.
"Depreciat4m of land in consequence of events.
"Negotiable instruments not met unless the real damage done can be clearly
established.
"Interest on loans.
"Money lent to Chinese, except in transactions when the security given was amply
sufficient.
"To private individuals:
"Mental suffering and injuries of any character.
"Illness, except in cases where it entails incapacity for work.
"Traveling expenses other than journeys to the nearest places of safety.
"Destruction of Chinese houses rented to foreigners.
"Loss of diplomas.
"Loss of customers.
"To Chinese:
"Chinese capital invested in commercial or industrial undertakings in association
with foreign capital.
"To compradores, goods, being his personal property, which were lost in a godown belonging to a foreigner," 1901 FoR. REL. APP. 106; III WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1789 (1943).
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sumptions of mortality would not cause a loss to the companies because
ordinary hazards and the ultimate certainty of death are covered by the
premiums charged. The companies did not claim subrogation to the
.insured, it being clear that claims by way of subrogation are not allowable in respect of life insurance.
The German agent opposed these claim~ principally on two grounds.
One was that no loss had occurred because the premium based roughly
on mortality tables allowed a margin for risks not specifically apprehended. He pointed out that changes in the habits of people, such as the
use of new means of transportation, notably the automobile, unforeseen
disasters, such as earthquakes, and epidemics were recognized by insurance companies and were meant to, be covered by margin collected by
the companies above the amount of such shown by mortality tables.
He argued that the risks to noncombatants during a war were of the
same general sort as those for other disasters. Risks during war to
noncombatants did not originate with the submarines.
The second ground of opposition by the German agent was that
the loss to the companies was not·proximately caused by the sinking of
the Lusitania. The Americ~n authorities in support of the German
position seem to indicate that rules of proximate cause are primarily
rules of policy. As a matter of logic it seems clear that the sinking of
the Lusitania did impose an unexpected burden upon the life insurance
companies. There was no active intervening cause: The sinking was
certainly a substantial factor; Moreover, in the modern world such a
loss was foreseeable. Nevertheless, there are obvious reasons of policy
for not allowing recovery when A has contractual relations with B and
A's injury to B causes a consequential loss to C. The variety, extent and ramifications of contractual relations would result under a contrary
rule in the possibility of a startling number of actions in some cases,
when for example, the death of a single person was caused by the negligence of another. The prevailing American view therefore is that there
is no recovery unless the defendant can be shown to have intended the
injury to the contractual relations.6
6 Anthony v. Slaid, l l Met. (Mass.) 290 ( l 846) ; Gregory v. Brooks, 3 5 Conn.
437 (1868); Dale v. Grant, 34 N. J. L. 142 (1870); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. N. Y. and N. H. R. R. Co., 25 Conn. 265 (1856); Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95
U.S. 754 (1877); Savings Bank v. Ward, IOO U.S. 195 (1879). See also I SEDGWICK, TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, 9th ed., 219 (1912); Le Lievre
and Pennes v. Gould, [1893] l Q. B. 491; Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co.,
L. R. IO Q. B. 453 (1875); Simpson and Co. v. Thomson, Burrell, 3 App. Cas. (H. L.)
279 (1877). The civil law like the common law does not allow recovery for damages
suffered by,third persons who are in contractual relations to those who or whose property has been injured.
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The German agent also asserted that the insurance companies had
suffered no injury to property because the insurance policies did not
constitute property in legal contemplation.
The American commissioner in his opinion relying on Administrative Decision I, and the decision in the Lusitania cases held the companies had suffered damage to property. 1
The German commissioner held after a technical discussion of the
meaning of the term "property" as used in the Knox-Porter Resolution, and Article 244, Clause 9 of Annex I of the Versailles Treaty,
that only damage to material and tangible property was to be paid for
by Germany. His argument referred to Article 232 of the treaty and
concluded that the insurance companies had no valid claim. 8
Judge Parker, the umpire, after reviewing in considerable detail
the arguments of both sides, stated that there is no relation of cause ·
and effect between (I) the contemplation or not by the insurer at the
time of issuing the policy of the risk which subsequently caused the
death of the insured, and ( 2) the loss or profit to the insurer. He rejected the contention that losses must necessarily have occurred merely
because a policy matured due to a risk not contemplated in computing
the premium.9 On the other hand, he found that the acceleration in
the time of payment of the policies reduced the actual or prospective
profits of the companies, and that, in fact, losses were suffered by the
companies. Nevertheless, the umpire held that the companies could
not recover because the proximate cause of their loss was not in legal
contemplation the act of Germany.
After observing that German action was the proximate cause of the
loss of pecuniary contributions, which dependents and others were accustomed to receive and could reasonably expect to continue to receive
from those lost on the Lusitania, the umpire asserted that life insurance
claims rested on a different basis.
"Although the act of Germany was the immediate cause of
maturing the contracts of insurance by which th,e. insurers were
bound this effect so produced was a circumstance incidental to,
but not fl.owing from, such act as the normal consequence thereof,
and was, therefore, in legal contemplation remote-not in timebut in natural and normal sequence. The payments made by the
insurers to other American nationals, beneficiaries under such poli7

MIXED CLAIMS COMMISSION, UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, ADMINISTRATIVE

DECISIONS AND OPINIONS 104 (1924), hereafter cited as ADM. DEC. AND OP.
8
Id. at I IO. See KrnsSELBACH, PROBLEMS OF THE GERMAN-AMERICAN CLAIMS
COMMISSION 58 (1930).
9
ADM. DEc. AND OP. 121 (1924).
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cies, were based on, required, and caused not by Germany, but by
their contract obligations. To these contracts Germany was not
a party, of them she had no notice, and with them she was in no
wise connected. These contract obligations formed no part of any
life that was taken. They did not inhere in it. They were quite
outside and apart from it. They did not operate in or affect it. In
striking down the natural man, Germany is not in legal contem-'
plation held to have struck every artificial contract obligation, of
which she had no notice, directly or remotely connected with that
man. The accelerated maturity of the insurance contracts was not
a natural and normal consequence of Germany's act in taking the
lives, and hence not attributable to that act as a proximate cause." 10
The umpire made the further point that from the standpoint of
the United States as a claimant in behalf of its nationals, the losses of
the insurance company were not a loss to the nation, but only losses
which were shifted from one group of nationals to another. "It is obvious that precisely to the extent that the American insurers have sustained losses by reason of being prematurely deprived of the use of
funds paid by them to American beneficiaries such American beneficiaries have been correspondingly benefited through the acceleration in
the time of such payments to them." 11
The umpire noted that no case had been cited to show where either
a municipal or international tribunal had awarded damages to any party
to a contract claiming a loss as a result of the killing of the second party
to such· a contract by a third party without any intent of disturbing or
destroying such contractual relations, as follows:
"The ever-increasing complexity of human relations resulting from the tangled network of intercontractual rights and
obligations are such that no one could possibly foresee all the
far-reaching consequences, springing solely from the contractual
relations, of the negligent or wilful taking of a life. There are
few deaths caused by human agency that do not pecuniarily affect
those with whom the deceased has entered into contractual relations; yet through all ages no system of jurisprudence has essayed
the task, no international tribunal or municipal court has essayed
the task, and law, which is always practical, will hesitate to essay
the task, of tracing the consequences of the death of a human
being through all the ramifications and the tangled web of contractual relations of modern business." 12
10

Id at 134.
Id. at I 36 et seq.
1
~ Id. at 137.
11.
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The umpire felt that the aggregate amount of the property loss
became fixed when the Lusitania sank and was not increased, diminished, nor in any way affected by the amount of insurance or reinsurance.18
INSURANCE CLAIMS BY SuBROGATIO_N ·

Insurers who pay indemnities under insurance contracts other than
life insurance are generally subrogated both by common and civil law u
to the rights of the insured against the persons responsible for the
damage. In effect, this means that a suretyship relation is recognized
between the tort-feasor and the indemnitor; while both are under a
liability to the insured, between the two the tort-feasor rather than the
indemnitor ought to make good the wrong. If the indemnitor performs, he is not only entitled to assume the position of the insured,
but he may also be allowed a right of reimbursement.
When both insurer and insured are nationals of the same country,
the problem of an international tribunal or of a domestic tribunal
distributing a lump sum award, is largely one of determining the total
damage and allocating it to the parties in view of their contractual relations and their performance of their contracts. Since in theory the claim .
is that of the nation, it is rarely important to the defendant nation how
the proceeds of the award are to be divided.
Where the insurer and the insured have different nationalities the
theoretical basis of the claim of the owner becomes important. Suppose
an American insurance company has issued a marine policy on a neutral
ship and cargo. The ship is sunk by a German submarine. A peace
settlement makes Germany responsible for injury to American property. The insurance company pays the face of the policy. If the company has a right only by subrogation it may be argued that there is no
13

Id. at 135.

u See as to cases which have been decided by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals:

"La Reunion fran!;aise" v. Etat allemand (Trib. Arb. Mixtes franco-allemand, 1922),
I RECUEIL DES D:fomoNs DES TRIBUNAUX ARBITRAUX MxxTES 770 at 773 (French
Law), hereafter cited REcUEIL. "Fonciere," Compagnie generale d'assurance
v. Etat serbe-croate-slovene, (Trib. Arb. Mixte hungaro-serbe-croate-slovene, 1929)
9 RECUEIL 400 (Hungarian law). In fact, the. principle of subrogation was not
applied in the French case in which the insured French corporation had assigned all
its rights to the claimant in July, 1920. Claimant was awarded• 2,500,000 francs
although merely 737,754 francs had been paid in July, 1920 to the insured corporation for the purpose of compensating it for the loss of platinum which had been
requisitioned by Germany during the transport from Siberia to France at"the beginning
of the war. There are no parallel cases in respect of marine underwriters. It will be
remembered that the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal had no jurisdiction rega;ding losses of
hulls and cargoes.
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justification for the espousal of the claim of the United States.1:r If,
on the other hand, the right of the American company always exists,
being contingent until the date of payment, 11-nd if that right can be
regarded as property from the standpoint of international law_ or by
specification in the post-war settlement, the United States can espouse
the claim. A further inquiry may be whether the insurance company
has s_u:ffered a loss in fact, where it has other war insurance policies and
has charged premiums compensating it for the risk involved.
Prior to the entry of the United States into World War I, American marine indemnitors frequently insured British and neutral property. By such contracts the title to cargoes sold by Americans to foreign
buyers was frequently if not customarily in the buyers. In the event
that the cargo was destroyed and compensation paid by the insurer,
if the insurer had a direct claim the status and nationality of the insurer
were decisive. If he had only a derivative claim, that is, by subrogation, the claim in its origin was not that of an American national. The
problem might be further complicated where the American policy was
one of re-insurance, that is insurance for an insurer. Such American
' claims were not only of corporations, but of the United States Government, since the Veterans Bureau of War Risk Insurance had conducted
an extensive insurance in the interest of American commerce.
Numerous ~laims of marine underwriters, including the Veterans
Bureau, were presented to the Mixed Claims Commission. Both
American and German agents presented briefs on the subject. The
American agent argued that the insurer, by virtue of the insurance
contract had an interest in the insured property and that this interest
and the.contingent right of indemnity were property entitled to protection. The .German agent argued that the loss to the indemnitor
could not have been foreseen and that it, therefore, was a remote
damage, not entitled to compensation even if a property existed in the
insurer. The main argument of the Germans, however, was that this
economic interest on the part of the insurer was not property entitled
to protection by an 'international tribunal. Furthermore, the Germans
insisted that the risk was covered by the premiums and that in reality
the insurers had suffered no loss but a substantial profit. From a theo15 That was, mutatis mutandis, the position taken by the Trib. Arb. Mixte
Hung.-Yugoslav in the "Fonciere" case. The Anglo Oesterreichische Bank of Vienna
was owner of goods. The goods were shipped from Budapest and seized by Yugoslavian authorities. The shipment having been insured against war risk, the bank was
paid by the claimant. It was held by the tribunal that it had no jurisdiction according to 1:he principle nemo plus juris transfen:e potest quam ipse habet; nobody can
assign more rights than he has himself.
.
~
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retical viewpoint the Germans denied that a claim could be original
and derivative at the same time. In respect of the government claims,
the Germans pointed out that Section 5 of the Knox-Porter Resolution
mentioned only the claims of American nationals and that Administrative Decision No. I of the Mixed Claims Commission was .restricted to
private claims.
The opinion of the American commissioner supported the American Agent. He held that since Clause 9, Annex I, Article 244 of the
Treaty of Versailles referred both to "damage in respect of all property" and to "damages directly in consequence of hostilities or of any
operations of war," it was not necessary for the insured object to have
been in the possession of or owned by an American at the time of the
injury, that it was sufficient if the damage occurred "in respect of all
property" and that injury to an American insured was a damage directly in consequence of hostilities. The American commissioner also
extended the same principles to governmental claims for the neutrality
period under Article 298 of the Treaty of Versailles and its Annex and
for the war period under Article 244.
The German commissioner upheld the view of the German agent.
In addition to supporting the German position as to property the
German commissioner held that the American position was impracticable. The ramifications of insurance and re-insurance would involve
a host of interventions. Germany would be liable to American :i;einsurers as a result of the sinking of neutral or German goods by Allies
of the United States. Finally, the German commissioner was of the
opinion that in any event the American insurer would have to deduct
the premiums received.
The umpire rendered no decision on the principle of indemnitors'
claims because of an agreement e:ffected by the agents which resulted
in the following substantial payments to American claimants:
United States Veterans Bureau
Private American underwriters

$24,319,095.41
35,450,237.82

These awards bore interest at 5 per cent from November 11, 1918. The
awards to the private underwriters were 26 per cent of all awards to
private claimants.16
•
16 REPORT OF RoBERT W. BoNYNGE BEFORE MIXED CLAIMS COMMISSION 58
(1934), hereafter cited as BoNYNGE REP. (1934). ADM. DEc. AND OP. 1923-1932,
Appendix p. III; see also the briefs of the American Agency Docket Nos. 8, 94 and
208, and Nos. 3121-3180 as to which the present writer is indebted to Bingham,
Englar and Jones, New York; KrnssELBAcH, PROBLEMS OF THE GERMAN-AMERICAN
CLAIMS COMMISSION 66 (1930); PROBLEME UND ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DER DEUTSCH-
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The umpire subsequently in three other cases upheld the American position on the question of the direct property interest of the insurer. These cases involved sunken vessels insui,-ed in part by the
French Government. The Germans admitted liability to the American
owners to the extent not covered by French insurance, thus in effect
adopting the American position in the underwriters' claims cases. The
- Germans argued that the French property interest was the amount of
the French insurance with the franc at its value on the date of the loss.
The Americans argued that the insurance should be deducted only in
the smaller amount they had actually received in the depreciated franc.
The umpire's decision st:ates, "At the time of the loss the insurer had
a contingent and conditional property interest in the tangible thing
destroyed-the schooner-which interest .became absolute and fixed
upon payment by the insurer."The result was that although the value
of the object at the time of the destruction was decisive for Germany's
obligation, Germany could not rely upon the time of destruction, to
evaluate that part for which an American national had a right to enter
a claim. The net effect of the decision was that the Mixed Claims
Commission held that an insurer has a direct right to compensation if
the object insured by him is damaged by an act making another state
responsible, provided he has paid the insured in accordance with the
insurance contract. 17
. Following the Civil War and in accordance with the Treaty
of Washington of May 8, 187~,18 the Geneva Tribunal awarded
$15,550,000 which was paid by Great Britain to the United States and
distributed in accordance with awards made by the First and Second
Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims.19 Claims had been presented by the United States on behalf of insurance companies asking
reimbursement through subrogation for losses sustained by them in
the payment of insurance to American nationals. These claims were
apparently included, at least in part, in computing the amount awarded.
Under the Act of Congress of June 23, 1874, creating the First Court
of Commissioners, only those companies could share in its distribution
that could show that their actual losses were greater than their aggreAMERIKANISCHEN ScHADENs-CoMMISSION 440 (1927) (opinions of the Commissioners
in German translation; the English originals have not been published).
17
Docket No. 6120, ADM. DEc. AND OP. 654 (1926); Docket No. 5962, id.
657 (1926); Docket No. 6287, id. 659 (1926).
18
I MALLOY 700.
19
II WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN lNTERNATION~ LAW 1300 (1937); III id. 1772
(1943).
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gate premiums and other profits on war-risk insurance.20 This restriction was removed by the Act of June 5, r882, reconstituting the Court
of Commissioners.21 It should be noted, however, that the Alabama
Commissioners did not purport to follow international law. Their duty
was to distribute a lump sum in accordance with domestic policy as
enunciated by statute.
WAR RISK INSURANCE PREMIUM CLAIMS

The United States presented to the Mixed Claims Commission a
group of claims for reimbursement for war-risk insurance premiums
paid during the period of American neutrality. 22 The umpire in Administrative Decision II had stated a principle of causality respecting
German liability as follows: "It matters not how many links there
may be in the chain of causation connecting Germany's act with the loss
sustained, provided there is no break in the chain and the loss can be
clearly, unmistakably, and definitely traced, link by link, to Germany's
act.28 The American agent argued that Germany's war measures
caused certain Americans to take out war risk policies and that the large
premiums paid on such policies were an element of damage for which
they could recover. Judge Parker as umpire, decided adversely to
these claims, November r, r923. 24
The umpire's opinion opens with an interesting review of the effect
of the war on American commerce and· of the creation of the Bureau of
War-Risk Insurance of the Treasury Department (at that time the
Bureau was part of the Veterans Bureau), in view of the reluctance of
American companies to cover war-risk policies. He pointed out incidentally that while the economic loss because of the war was real, the
actual loss was not borne by the exporters who paid, the war-risk premiums, but by the producers, especially of cotton, in the reduced price
of their products or by the consumers in the increased price paid by
them. The umpire held that the claims for war-risk insurance premiums were not claims for injury or damage to property within the terms
of the Treaty of Berlin. They were claims to recover for sums paid
for protection against possible happenings which had not in fact oc20

18 Stat. L. 245; Docket No. 1089, JOHN DAVIS, REPORT 115 (1877).
22 Stat. L. 98.
22
There were 3,450 claims approximating $345,000,000 filed for war-risk premiums. Three cases, United States Steel Products Co., Docket No. 20, Costa Rica
Union Mining Co., Docket No. 22, and South Porto Rico Sugar Co., Docket No. 27
were decided as test cases. BoNYNGE REPORT cited supra, note 16, 20 (1934).
28
ADM. DEc. AND OP. 5 at I 3.
24 Jd. at 33·
21
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curred. The risks to both neutral and belligerent commerce were of a
speculative and uncertain nature, incident to the existence ·of a state of
maritime war participated in by both groups of belligerents. While
Germany was responsible for its own acts, it could not be held liable
for losses incident to the very existence of a state of war. The claims
were for damage indefinite and undeterminable and too remote as a
matter of causation to afford a basis upon which to predicate an inter-'
national claim under a treaty.
The umpire's opinion contained a review of the handling of American claims after the award o~ the Geneva Tribunal in the case of the
'Alabama claims. Under the act creating the second Court of Commissioners, the court was authorized to make payments of claims for warrisk premiums after other claims having a priority were paid. The
umpire after considering the history of the Geneva Tribunal concluded
that although the lump sum award in fact was sufficient so that out of
it such claims were paid, the Geneva Tribunal itself had never recog. nized such claims in computing the award. 25 In his opinion claims for
war-risk insurance premiums were not recoverable under international
law.
After the test cases on war-risk insurance premiums were decided,
the American agent submitted the claim of the Eastern Steamship
Lines, Inc., for war-risk insurance premiums, with the argument that
the circumstances of this claim provided a chain of causation which
justified an exception to the rules stated in the test cases.26
The Eastern Steamship Lines operated eight vessels in the coastwise trade between New York and New England ports. On July 2r,
1918, while the United States was at war with Germany, an American
tug, the Perth Amboy, towing four barges, was attacked off the Massachusetts coast by a German submarine. The barges were sunk by gun
fire and the Perth Amboy was severely damaged. The Perth Amboy
was not the property of the Eastern Steamship Lines but following
the sinking, the corporation took out war-risk insurance policies which
it maintained in force until the Armistice. The company contended
that the proximate cause of its paying the war-risk premiums was the
attack on the Perth Amboy. The company added a claim for loss of
revenue due to talling off of its passenger business, which it ascribed
to the threatened danger from submarines.
)'

25 See notes 18-21, and especially II WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 1305 (1937).
26 United States on behalf of Eastern Steamship Lines, Inc., v. Germany, Docket
No. 436, ADM. DEc. AND OP, 71.
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The umpire held that the loss from the payment of the premiums
was not pFoximately caused by Germany. The claimant's ships were not
damaged by Germany. The expenses incurred for insurance were due
to measures adopted on its own volition and by its own discretion. They
were incidents to the existence of a state of war.
On the subject of damage from loss of business the umpire asked
if the company could recover the additional cost if it had diverted its
transportation activities to railroads and paid the difference between its
charges and those of th_e railroads. If its crews had been thrown out of
work, could they recover their losses from Germany? If the ·company
had decided to insure its passengers as a device to maintain its business,
would such cost be recoverable? If summer residents near the Massachusetts shore, alarmed by the Perth Amboy attack, had moved inland,
could their expenses be a recoverable item? The umpire thought his
inquiries indicated the untenable nature of the company's claim because·
of its far-reaching implications. His conslusion was a denial that Germany's act was a proximate cause of the loss, within the rules theretofore construed by the commission.
GERMAN LIABILITY FOR INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCY

An interesting case regarded as coming within the field of problems
of proximate cause was presented in the claim of the United States on
behalf of the New York Superintendent of Insurance as statutory liquidator for American policyholders of the N orske Loyd Insurance
Company, Ltd., a Norwegian corporation, admitted to do business in
New York. The company became insolvent in 192.r. Policyholders
whose policies were issued through the New York office, had been
held entitled to a preference as to New York assets of the company
and they were paid in full. Other American policyholders were able
to recover only about 23 per cent of what was due under their policies.
The American agent claimed that the Norske Lloyd was rendered
insolvent through the destruction by Germany of insured property not
belonging to American nationals. German war activities were alleged
to have made the insurance written by the company improvident and a
source of loss. The American demand was for reimbursement to the
extent that the Norwegian corporation's insolvency prevented payment.
The Mixed Claims Commission held that the loss to Americans
was not the natural and normal consequence of the act of Germany in
destroying property not American owned, which happened to be insured by an insurer which had issued policies to Americans. The opinion pointed out that but for the existence of war the neutral insurer

•
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would have written no war-risk insurance. The insurer doubtless
thought its premiums covered adequately the risks involved. Its error
could not be attributed to Germany as a proximate cause of American
loss. 21
PROSPECTIVE EARNINGS AND PROFITS

Both the common law 28 and civil law 29 systems allow reasonably
anticipated earnings and profits as an element of damage in both contract and tort cases. Uncertain, remote, contingent and speculative
profits obviously are excluded. International tribunals, likewise may
consider claims for prospective profits 30 unless such claims are removed
from the tribunal's jurisdiction by the agreement creating it, as has
sometimes been the case where it is recognized that the total sum which
can be anticipated will be inadequate to satisfy all claims.81
One of the most important international recognitions of prospective
profits as an element of damage was by the. Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorz6w Factory case.32
27

United States on behalf of Beha v. Germany, Docket No. 3919, ADM. DEc.
AND OP. 901, BoNYNGE REPORT cited supra, note 16, 24 (1934). Cf. claim of the
Standard Oil Co. of N.J., Docket No. 7498. The company was the majority shareholder of a Dutch corporation whose petroleum products were destroyed by Belgium
on Belgian territory in 1914. The commission held that since this was a neutrality
claim, German liability depended upon a showing that the loss was due to an act of
Germany. It was held that the destruction was not such an act. ADM. DEc. AND OP.
877; BoNYNGE REPORT cited supra, note 16, 23 (1934).
28
See Ingram-Day Lumber Co. v. McLouth, 275 U. S. 471 at 474, 48 S. Ct.
153 (1928).
29
The Roman law terms are damnum emergens meaning actual present damage
and lucrum cemms, meaning cessation of profit.
30
See cases cited III WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1836 et seq.
(1943).
31 For example, prospective profits could not be considered by the First Court of
Commissioners of Alabama Claims, 18 Stat. L. 243, 247.
Art. 250 of the Treaty of Trianon provided that property, rights and interests
of Hungarian nationals or corporations which were sequestrated or liquidated in Yugoslavia should "be restored to their owners freed from any measure of this kind, or from
any other measure of transfer, •.. in the condition in which they were before the
application of the measures in question." This wording was interpreted by Trib. Arb.
Mixte hungaro-serbe-croate-slovene, as excluding compensation for loss of profits or
debasement; Jules Baranyai ( real estate), Banque hongroise de commerce de Pest
(branch), Bureau de change "Mercur" (limited partnership), Dr. Bela Kelemen (real
estate) v. Etat serbe-croate- slovene; 7 REcUEIL 858, 867, 873 (1927), 9 RECUEIL
183 (1929).
82
PERM. CT. INT. J., CoLLECTION OF JUDGMENTS, Judgment No. 13, Series
A-No. 17, p. 46 (1928). See also II WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
1529 (1937). There were in all five judgments of the court relating to this matter.
In addition to the judgment No. 13, there were No. 6 (1925); No. 7 (1926); No. 8
(1927) and No. Ii (1927). These judgments are also printed. in I HuDsoN, WoRLD
COURT REPORTS 475 (1934).
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A nitrate factory, owned by the German Empire, was sold December 24, I 9 r 9, to a German corporation. The territory upon which the
factory was located became Polish, and on July 1, 1922, a Polish court,
referring to Article 256 of the Treaty of Versailles (property of the
German Empire), declared that the right of ownership was to be registered in the name of the Polish Treasury. In r926, the Permanent
Court held that the seizure was contrary to the Geneva Convention,
which was made by Poland and Germany on March 5, r922. The decision in respect of indemnifi~ation which was rendered September I 31
r928, could not influence the judgments of Mixed Arbitral Tribunals
after the last war, but it will certainly be a leading case after this war.
Hence, it may be appropriate to state the guiding principles in the
language of the Court:
"The action of Poland . . . is not an expropriation-to render which lawful only the payment of fair compensation would
have been wanting; it is a seizure of property ... which could
not be expropriated even against compensation . . . . It follows
that the compensation ... is not necessarily limited to the value
of the undertaking at the moment of dispossession, plus interest
to the day of payment. This limitation would only be admissible
if the Polish Government had had the right to expropriate, and if
its wrongful act consisted merely in not having paid .... the just
price of what was expropriated. . . . Such a limitation might result in placing ... the interests protected by fhe Geneva Convention ... in a situation more unfavorable than that in which ...
these interests would have been if Poland had respected the said
Convention. Such a consequence . . . would be tantamount to
rendering lawful liquidation and unlawful dispossession indistinguishable in so far as their financial results are concerned.
"The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an
illegal act--a principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals-is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment
of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind
would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained
which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in
place of it-such are the principles which would serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law. . . .
" ... The dispossession of an industrial undertaking . . . then
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involves the obligation to rester~ _the undertaking, [ on which
the parties were agreed in this case], and, if this be not possible to
pay its value at the time of the indemnification, which value is designed to take the place of restitution which has become impossible.
To this obligation, in virtue of the general principles of inter1?-ational law, must be added that of compensating loss sustained
as the result of seizure....
" ... Without entering into this discussion and without denying the importance which the question of :east of construction may
have in determining the value of the undertaking, the Court
merely observes that it is by no means impossible that the cost of
construction of a factory may not correspond to the value which
that factory will have when built....
"Nor: yet can the Court ... be satisfied with. the price stipulated in the contract of December 24th, 1919, . . . or with the
offer of sale of the shares ... to the· Geneva Compagnie d'azote
et de fertilisants made on May 26th, 1922 .... [Both moments]
belong to a period of serious economic and monetary crisis; the
difference between the value which the undertaking then had and
that which it would have had at present may therefore be very
considerable ....
" ... As regards the sum agreed on at one moment by the two
Governments during the negotiations which followed Judgment
No. 7,' ... the Court cannot take into account declarations, admissions or proposals .
when such negotiations have not led to a
complete agreement. . . ." 88
·
•

•

0

The questions which were formulated for the guidance of experts
selected to compute the damage are as well-weighed as the rules of
substantive law:

"I-A. What was the value on July 3rd, 1922, expressed in
Reichsmarks . . . of the undertaking for the manufacture of
nitrate products of which the factory was situated at Chorz6w in
Polish Upper Silesia, in the state in which that undertaking (including the lands, buildings, equipment, stocks and processes at
its disposal, supply and delivery contracts, goodwill and future
prospects) wa,s, on the date indicated, in the hands of the Bayerische and Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke?
"B. What would have been the financial results, expressed _in
Reichsmarks ... (profits or losses), which would probably have
been given by the undertaking thus constituted from J uily 3rd,
1922, to the date of the present judgment, if it had been in the
hands of the said companies?
33

Id. at 51.
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"IL-What would be the value at the date of the present
judgment, expressed in Reichsmarks ... of the same undertaking
( Chorz6w) if that undertaking ... had remained in the hands of
the Bayerische and Oberschlesischs Stickstoffwerke, and had either
remained substantially as it was in r 922 or had been developed
proportionately on lines similar to those applied in the case of
other undertakings of the same kind, controlled by the Bayerische,
for instance, the undertaking of which the factory is situated at
Piesteritz? ...
" [ Question II] ... contemplates the present value . . . from
two points of view: ... secondly, the factory is to be considered
in the state in which it would (hypothetically but probably) have
been in the hands of the Oberschlesische and Bayerische, if ...
it had· been able to continue its supposedly normal development ....
". . . The hypothetical nature of this question is considerably
diminished by the possibility of comparison with other undertakings of the same nature directed by the Bayerische, and in particular, with the Piesteritz factory, the analogy of which with Chorz6w, as well as certain differences between the two, have been
many times pointed out. . . .
·
"As regards the lucrum cessans, in relation to question II, it
may be remarked that the cost of upkeep of the corporeal objects
. . . and . . . the cost of improvement and normal development
of the installation and of the industrial property incorporated
therein, are bound to absorb in a large measure the profits, real or
supposed, of the undertaking. Up to a certain point,. therefore,
any profit may be left out of account, for it will be included in the
real or supposed value of the undertaking at the present moment.
If, however, the reply given by the experts to Question I B should
show that after making good the deficits for the years during
which the factory was working at a loss, and after due provision
for the cost of upkeep and normal improvement during the following years, there remains a margin of profit, the amount of such
profit should be added to the compensation to be a-~arded.
"On the other hand, if the normal development pre-supposed
by question II represented an enlargement of the undertaking and
an investment of fresh capital, the amount -of such sums must be
,deducted from the value sought for.
·
"The Court does not fail to appreciate the difficulties presented
by these two questions, difficulties which are ... closely connected
with the time that elapsed between the dispossession and the .demand for compensation, and with the transformations of the factory and the progress made in the industry with which the factory
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is concerned. In view of these difficulties, the Court considers it
preferable to endeavor to ascertain the value to be estimated by
several methods, in order to permit of a comparison and if necessary of completing the results of the one by those of the others ... .
" ... The Chorz6w factory to be valued by the experts includes also the chemical factory.... The fact that the chemical
factory was ... not even completed ... can be of no importance;
. . . the entry into working . . . was only the normal and duly
foreseen development of the industrial activity which the Oberschlesische had the right to exercise in Polish Upper Selesia...•
"It ... remains to be considered whether ... the Bayerische
has ... suffered damage; other than that sustained by the undertaking.... The possibility of competition ... by a third party,
alleged to have unlawfully become acquainted with . . . that
Company's processes, is certainly the circumstance which is ...
easiest to appreciate in this connection. The Court must however
observe ... that the damage alleged to have resulted from competition is insufficiently proved. Moreover, it would come under
the heading of possible but contingent and indeterminate damage,
which, in accordance with the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals,
cannot be taken into account. This is more especially the case as
regards damage which might arise from the fact that the field in
which the Bayerische can carry out its experiments, perfect its
processes and make fresh discoveries has been limited." 34
The case was ultimately settled by agreement between Germany
and Poland. 35
Apparently no case was decided by the Mixed Claims Commission, United 'States and Germany, where an undertaking (bra~ch ·or
subsidiary) had been sequestrated or liquidated by the Treuhaender
fuer das f eindliche V ermoegen ( the German Alien Property Custodian), or the German states.86 The question whether loss of profits
was an appropriate item in such cases •was left open by the Mixed
Claims Commission. 37 The Mixed Arbitral Tribunals handled the
34

Id. at 51.
See III WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1839 (1943).
36
The reason may be that such direct investments were considerably less frequent
than in l 941 and that there, was no interference as to American property beyond the
fact that profits were to be delivered to the custodian from April 1, 1917; GERMAN
ALIEN PROPERTY CusTODIAN (Nieders) REPORT CoNCERNING THE TREATMENT OF
AMERICAN PROPERTY 1N GERMANY 17 (1921).
87
United States on behalf of American-Hawaiian Steamship Company v. Germany, Docket No. 6454, ADM. DEc. AND OP. 843 at 847 (1926): "Nothing herein
35
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subject-matter in many cases. There was no doubt that loss of profit
might be considered. The difficulty was always to decide how the evidence was to be weighed and how the rules were to be applied. Some
typical cases may be described to show how the task was performed.
I. Claimant let cars for hire. Leaving Germany August 1, 1914,
his car was requisitioned. Replacement value ( 70,000 francs) and loss
of profits (80,000 francs) were asked for. An expert opinion was ordered which was to state the amount sufficient to buy a car of the same
standard and description, account being taken of the depreciation of
14 months in the service of such business and the presumptive profits
since August 1914, the necessary rates of depreciation to be deducted. 38
2. The late Mr. A. B. Catty, English national, and Dr. Holzberg,
a German, were the owners of the "Heidelberg College." The partnership property consisted of buildings, land, a sports ground, furniture
and fittings, boats and a number of trophies. On July 31, 1916, the
liquidation of the claimant's property was ordered. Dr. Holzberg
bought Mr. Catty's personal belongings for 1,000 marks, Mr. Catty's
half of the furniture for 2,000 marks, and Mr. Catty's half of the
property, including good will, for 88,ooo marks. Moreover, he took
upon himself the liability for Mr. Catty's half share of mortgages
which totalled 120,000 marks. An architect of Heidelberg valued the
property at 483,232 marks as of July 31, 1916. Mr. Catty's share
was, therefore, 181,616 marks of which he had received 88,ooo marks,
leaving a balance of 93,616 marks. The claimant was held entitled to
receive the balance at the rate of exchange prevailing through a neutral
currency on July 31, 1916. The rate through Zurich was 26 Mk.
75 pfg. to the pound on that date. Hence,£ 3,499.13.3 were awarded.
The award in respect of the college furniture, boats and trophies was
£ 305.12.2. The value of the personal belongings was assessed at
10,000 marks, representing£ 336.9.0. Claimant's demand of £3,000
in respect of the goodwill of the college was granted to 1.66 per cent,
i.e., £ 50. In view of the special character of the school, and that it
catered primarily to English boys, the tribunal was of the opinion
contained will be· taken as affecting the right of the United States to recover on behalf
of its nationals for the loss of the use or enjoyment of property seized and held or
used by Germany in German territory."
38 Haret v. Etat allemand, (Trib. Arb. Mixte franco-allemand, 1921) 1 REcUEIL
98. No indemnification was granted for loss of use where a car was not intended for
hire; Zervoulakos v. Etat allemand, (Trib. Arb. Mixte greco-allemand, 1925) 5 RECUEIL 431 at 437•
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that on July 31, 1916, the value of the goodwill had almost entirely
vanished. 39
'
3. The German branch of a Belgian· corporation was sequestrated
by the German authorities. The outstanding accounts were collected.
After the war the branch's bank deposit was 670,073.19 marks, which
was converted into 827,237.73 francs at the pre-war rate (r.2345)
through the Clearing Office. Claimant asked for 20,000 francs more as
damages. The demand was granted, the tribunal being of opinion that
the provisions of Article 297 (h), section 14 of the Annex and Article
296 were distinct from the provision of Article 297 ( e), and that the
valorization of the cash assets did not constitute a full compensation
of the damage which was su:ffered by the Belgian corporation, having
been deprived during some years of the possibility of using the considerable amount in Belgium. The control charges were to be refunded,
valorized at the pre-war rate, five per cent interest to be added. 40
4. Two plots of building land at Pirmasens, Germany, of which the
English claimant was part owner, were sold in February 1917. He
recovered the proceeds in the sum of£ 1,234.3.3 on the basis of Article
297 (h), while he would have received£ 853.17.5 if buyer's payments
had been converted and transferred in 1917. Nevertheless, he claimed
and was granted compensation for the loss of use, i.e., 5 per cent on
41
£ 853.17.5.
In algebra, the problem of x+y=z may not be solved until two
unknowns are determined. Juridical problems often start with similar
unknown quantities. The Mixed Arbitral Tribunals had to answer the
question whether and what profits would have been made if x ( depreciation of the mark) and y ( exceptional war measures) had not occurred. They were only able to find approximate values but more is·
generally not possible in the field of indemnification. A special difficulty
arose, as has been seen, from the fact that exchange values were prescribed in certain situations. That was especially the case where business
was sequestrated.
89

A. B. Catty v. German Government, (Trib. Arb. Mixte anglo-allemand, 1924)
26 I.
4° Cristalleries du Val Saint-Lambert v. Etat allemand, (Trib. Arb. Mixte germano-belge, 1924) 4 REcUEIL 686. .
·
41 Benjamin Strauss v. German Government, (Trib. Arb. Mixte anglo-allemand,
1926) 6 RECUEIL 17. See·also A. Westendarp and A. Granville v. German Government, (Trib. Arb. Mixte anglo-allemand, 1924) 4 RECUEIL 239; and Susan Carswell
Lister v. German Government, (Trib. Arb. Mixte anglo-allemand, 1926) 6 REcUEIL 34•
4

RECUEIL
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5. The English claimants were transport agents. Their branch at
Hamburg was placed under sequestration December 30, 1914. The
difference between proceeds of liquidation and claim is always great in
such situations, the smaller the business, th~ greater, often, is the proportionate difference. It was especially large here. While the proceeds
of liquidation were 1,164.07 marks, compensation was asked in four
items: ( l) 32,944.61 marks in respect of the "fonds de corrvmerce;"
(2) 5 per cent annual interest during five years; (3) 25,928.33
marks annually, i.e. 129,691.65 marks for loss of profits; (4) 300
marks for the furniture, valorized at the pre-war rate of 1 M=r.25
francs, totaling 224,988.50 francs. The award was 30,000 marks for
the fonds de corrvmerce, yielding at the exchange rate of December 30,
1914, 33,990 francs, plus five per cent annual interest from that date.
Loss of profits was denied because if claimants had been able to
transfer their business from Hamburg to Paris, they would not have
made profits at Hamburg. Germany's defense had been that the profits
had not fallen off for the reason of any exceptional war measures, but
of the war itself and the blockade.42
6. The Berlin branch of a French dressmaking business was sequestrated and liquidated, being indebted to the Paris firm to the
amount of 236,167.01 marks according to its balance-sheet of May 31,
1914. The credit account was not considered to be evidence of realizable property because there had been continual losses before the war.
An item of 290,000 francs for loss of profits was denied for the same
reason. Germany was held liable for the va1ue of the stock on hand
because the stock was immobilized by the German Decree of October
7, 1915,48 to be valued at the rate of that date, and for the cash assets
which were outstanding after the liquidation to be valued at the prewar rate. Apparently, due attention was paid to the fact that both
items cover the same ground to a certain degree. In total, the award
was 59,897.14 franCS. 44
7. War bonds of 2,000,000 marks were bought by the sequestrator
of the Leipzig branch of a French corporation.45 Claimant contended
that it would have been able to earn 700,000 francs with that part of
42

Perrier et Marest v. Etat allemand, (Trib. Arb. Mixte franco-allemand,

1 RECUEIL 778.
48
REICHSGESETZBLA'IT 630.
44
Bernheim Freres v. Etat allemand,

(Trib. Arb. Mixte franco-allemand,

1922)

1922)

2 RECUEIL 23.
45

Compagnie Generale de Fourrures (Furs) et Pelleteries v. Etat allemand,
(Trib. Arb. Mixte franco-allemand, 1922) 2 RECUEIL 39.
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its working capital between January 1, 1917 and June 30, 1920. The
members of the tribunal were not of this opinion because the average
of the earnings from 19m to 1914 was less than the average of 1915·
to 1920.
8. War bonds were also bought by the sequestrator of a Strasbourg
plant to preserve truffles. The investment was annulled. 46 The amount
applied to that investment was valorized at the pre-war exchange rate.
· Although claimant had _asked for the sale of the fittings, he was held
entitled to indemnification because one of the reasons for his request
was the sequestration. _The liability of Germany was not dependent
on any special fault and request for a sale was not an intervening independent cause. An item for loss of profits was granted, however, not
to the amount asked for of 45,000 francs, but only 10,000 francs, plus
5 per cent interest from November 25, 1920.47
9. The Societe Generale d' Evaporation and the MachinenbauAktiengesellschaft Balcke established the Gesellschaft fuer V erdampfanlagen m.b.H. at Bochum for the purpose of . exploiting certain
evaporating processes. At the end of the year 1917 claimant's interest
was sequestrated. The Gesellschaft fuer Verdampfanlagen • m.b.H.
was dissolved on Balcke's demand. Contracts in respect of joint adventures, voting trusts and partnerships, were validated by France on the
basis of Article 299, hence the dissolution was not justified. Not less
than 5,014,600 marks, valorized to 122.76 (6,155,923 francs), were
claimed under the head of loss of profits. The defense was that the
Gesellschaft fuer Verdampfanlagen had been a losing business, its
product not having been adaptable for use in Germany. The tribunal.
held that the bad results of early years were due to the developmental
stage of the business and that better results might have been expected
in the years 1918 to 1922, namely, an average of 59,400 marks to be
Under s. 12 of Ann. to Sect. IV of Part X.
A Rousseau v. Etat allemand, · (Trib. Arb. Mixte franco-allemand, 1921)
1 RECUEIL 371. A somewhat similar problem was treated in Cornesse Freres v. Etat
allemand, (Trib. Arb. Mixte germano-belge, 1924) 4 REcUEIL 83 in a considerably
deviating way. The defense that the claimant suspended the fabrication of the tannery
"Eifeler Lederwerk Gesellschaft m.b.H.," at Malmedy and sold voluntarily was held
good to about two-thirds. Francs 100,000 were claimed, 32,500 were granted, "attendu
que, quelle que soit en effet lu theorie de la causalite a laquelle on se rallie, le fait que
le dommage a ete cause par un acte du Iese n'entrafoe pas necessairement la rupture
du lien causal; qu'il convient seulement, lorque l'acte du defen4eur n'est pas la faute
unique du prejudice, de reduire sa responsabilite, et cela dans la mesure ou d'autres
causes ont contribrue a la survenance du dommage."
46

47
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exchanged at the rate of the end of the respective years. "The total
award was 98,2r r.20 francs. 48
IO. To escape a higher duty, claimants, the French pro.ducers of
the perfumes "Pinaud" sent supplies of raw materials to their Strasbourg branch, "c' etait a Strasbourg que se faisait le dosage des melanges." The branch was sequestrated, stock and utensils were sold in
the years I 9 I 5 to I 9 I 8 for 92,255 marks, and the equivalent of that
amount was paid through the Clearing Offices. An additional claim
of I 50,000 francs was demanded for loss of profits during six years.
The tribunal held for defendant because the stoppage was due to the
war itself, not to the sequestration or any other exceptional war rneasure.49
I I. An analogous situation was considered in a case where claimants were a partnership at Cognac whose distillery and office at Mainz
was liquidated. Only roo,ooo francs were grant~d as loss ot profits in
lieu of the claimed 2,000,000. Importing juice of French grapes was
impossible because of the war itself, not of any exceptional war measures. Profits were lost only during the time which was needed for
reconstruction. In respect of the stock, the replacement value on J anuary ro, 1920 was held to be the correct measurement. 50 The accounting
was based on the scale of prices which had been gathered by the Chamber of Commerce at Cognac.
The date of January ro, I 920, was chosen because German investmepts in France, which were sufficient to pay all the French claims,
based on Article 297, were transferred to France w~en the Treaty went
into effect. At that time, the French price level was approximately
double or three-fold that of r914. It was considerably higher in the
years r924-1927 when the compensations were paid. In fact, the claimants received frequently less than one-fourth of the replacement value.51
I2. Claimant's enterprise at ,Mackv'iller (Alsace) consisted of
handling and bottling wines of Champagne origin. On February ro,
48

Societe Generale d'Evaporation v. Etat allemand, (Trib. Arb. Mixte francoallemand, 1921) 1 REcUEIL 330.
49 Klotz et Cie v. Etat allemand, (Trib. Arb. Mixte franco-allemand, 1922) 2
RECUEIL 758.
, .
50

Remy Martin et Cie v. Etat allemand, (Trib. Arb. Mixte franco-allemand,
1924) 4 RECUEIL 410.
51
See ScHATZEL, DAs DEuTScH-FRANZOSISCHE GEMISCHTE ScHIEDSGERICHT,
SEINE GESCHICHTE, RECHSPRECHUNG UND ERGEBNISSE, UNIVERSITAT KIEL INSTITUT FUR INTERNATIONALES RECHT ERSTE REIHE VoRTRAGE UND EINZELSCHRIFTEN
HEFT 12, 74 (1930).
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1915, the branch was sequestrated. A notary public was,appointed as
sequestrator. Claimant's authorized agent carried on the business without interference of the notary. He sold the wine ·on liand at about prewar prices. After the war the branch was handed back to the claimant
with the outstanding accounts, but the stock had been sold. Claimant's claims were:
· (1) 1,207,193.24 francs to replace the merchandise not restored;
. (2) 251,227.60 francs for negligence in treatment of the wines'
and damage to the trademark;
(3) 125,000 francs for loss of profits.
The tribunal was of the opinion that-selling the stock of wines at
pre-war prices or only slightly above such prices, when replacement
was impossible for an indefinite time, was equivalent to liquidation of
the business. The sequestrator was not considered as having protected
the_interest of the owner. It 'Yas his duty to direct the management
of the ow'ner's representative, who was the legal agent of the sequestrator, especially because the agent was little more than a bookkeeper.
The replacement value of the wines sold might be claimed with deduction of ·219,318.25 francs as outstanding accounts which were
claimed through the Clearing Offices, of 30,000 francs· overhead
charges, and of charges which were connected with keeping up the
stock. Furthermore, it was deemed correct to sell s"'ome bottles which
had been visibly designed for immediate sale according to a fiscal mark..
In accordance with the declaration of the "Syndicat des vins de
champagne'' the value of a bottle was stated at eight francs and the
value of a half-bottle at 4.50 francs. The result of the complicated
computation was that 757,463 francs were granted on account of
item (1). On account of item (2), merely 10,000 francs were awarded
because the. clerk was found mainly. answerable. 52 The 128,000 francs
for loss of profits were denied because such award would duplicate the
compensation equal to replacement value.53
The question of prospective earnings and profits was presented to
the Mixed Claims Commission in a large number of cases involving,
among others, claims by a charterer of a destroyed ship for l~ss of net
52 The reason given is not easy to reconcile with the principal basis of the award.
Apparently, the tribunal wanted to compensate the defendant to a certain degree for
the consequences of its ex-post wisdom. "Ein Warenlager ist kein Museum,» stock is
no museum, observed the late professor Partsch to the tribunal in such a case; Id. at 76.
53
De Montebello v. Etat allemand, {Trib. Arb. Mixte franco-allemand, 1922)
2 RECUEIL 463; see Paille-Laurent v. Etat allemand, (Trib. Arb. Mixte francoallemand, 1922) 2 RECUEIL 445, also treating sparkling wines in a smaller business.
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profits he would have earned during the life of the charter, had the
ship not been destroyed; claims for the probable catch of a fishing
schooner; the amounts which would have been earned under a pending
contract of affreightment on an existing charter-party and the loss to
the crew of prospective personal earnings due to the destruction of a
ship. The commissioners were in disagreement as to the settlement
of the points of controversy. The umpire rendered two general administrative decisions, 54 which were followed by several decisions of the
commissioners applying the rules as stated in the test cases.
The issues involved required the umpire to make a comprehensive
review of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles in respect of Germany's liability and to consider how far if at all these were modified
by the Treaty of Berlin. He found by a review of the economic clauses
(Part x) of the Treaty of Versailles dealing with exceptional war measures within Germany, that is, the administration of foreign property
corresponding to that of the Alien Property Custodian in the United
States, that in this respect the treaty was applicable to intangible as
well as tangible property. As to property of American nationals outside German territory, the situation was distinctly different. The members of the Paris Conference had recognized Germany's inability to
satisfy all claims for which it might be held liable. The umpire, after
noting that Article 232 stated that Annex I to Section I of Part VIII
defined Germany's obligation to make compensation to the civilian
population of the Allied and the Associated Powers for damage to
their property, decided that paragraph 9 of Annex I was intended to
cover damages to tangible property. He further noted that, the Repa- .
ration Commission 55 had held that this paragraph did not authorize
claims for loss of profit or for supplementary expenses incurred to get
the advantages which normally would have been obtainable from the
property.
. The British account for damages by air raid and bombardment had
eliminated claims for loss of business, profits, good will and other consequential damage. The shipping losses as originally presented by the
Allies included damages which had been caused through the detention
of ships. But the Reparation Commission unanimously decided that
Germany was not liable for damages suffered by Allied nationals
through the loss of the use and enjoyment of their vessels and elimi54
Administrative Decision VII, May 12, 1925, ADM. DEc. AND OP. 273 (1926)
and Administrative Decision VIIA, Aug. 7, 1926, id. 704 (1926).
55
V Report on the Work from 1920 to 1922, 47•
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nated items from the British claim aggregating about 200,000,000
goldmarks. 56 The Reparation Commission was empowered to interpret
the treaty in such respects. 57 It was held that while Germany was
obligated to compensate for the value of property destroyed or converted or for the cost 9f repairing a material injury short of destruction, nevertheless Germany was not obligated to compensate for the
loss of enjoyment of or profit from such property. 58 Germany,. therefore, was not liable for the loss of the use of French factories and
industrial plants in the occupied French territory, neither during the
occupation nor during the period of reconstruction after the Armistice,
nor was it obligated to compensate French farmers for the loss of the
use of their lands. The compensation of land-owners whose orchards,
plantations, and vineyards were destroyed was limited to the cost of
replanting, plus the shrinkage in value of the land after replanting as
compared with "its value had it not been damaged. 59
In Administrative Decision No. VII the umpire discussed the
Knox-Porter Resolution and the Treaty of Berlin and decided that the
American government had not intended to impose on Germany a
greater liability than that fixed by the Treaty of Versailles. The American reservations were to preserve existing rights, not to create new
ones. In summarizing his opinion the umpire said:
"The Umpire decides that, save in excepted cases, Germany is
not obligated under the Treaty of Berlin to make compensation
for loss by American nationals (I) of prospective personal earnings as such, or ( 2) of prospective profits as such, growing out of
the destruction of property, but holds that the earning power and
the then value of the use of the property destroyed may be taken
into account with numerous other factors in determining the reasonable market value of such property at the time and place of
destruction, which value, with interest thereon as heretofore prescribed by this Commission, is the measure of Germany's liability.
The Umpire further decides that, save in certain excepted cases,
the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin dealing with damage to
property are limited to physical or material damage to tangible
56

Joint Report of the Maritime Service and the Valuation Service on maritime
losses of April 20, 1921, Ann. 735 j. of the records of the Reparation Commission,
referred to in U. S. on behalf of American-Hawaii'an Steamship Co. v. Germany,
Docket No. 6454, ADM. DEc. AND OP. 843, 845 (1926).
57
See § 13 (f) of Ann. II, Sec. I of Part Vlll.
58
Decision No. 998 of the Reparation Commission, dealing with "Claims for
loss of employment," embodied in its Minutes No. 145, March 4, 1921, at 845.
59
Minutes No. 172 of the Reparation Commission of April 15, 1921, at 846.
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things. But two or more different estates or interests in a tangible
thing may exist at the same time, the sum of which equals a full,
complete, absolute, unconditional and unencumbered ownership of
the whole, and it is important to avoid confusing the nature of
the damage to tangible things, with the nature of the estate or
interest in those tangible things damaged or destroyed: 1.Jnder
the Treaty a thing can have but one value but several estates and
interests may share in it." 60
Referring to cases where claims had been submitted by American
charterers of foreign ships and foreign charterers of American ships,
the umpire held that the charterer had an interest in the ship, that is,
the charterer was part-owner of tangible property. While' the value
of a ship might be affected by circumstances at the time it was destroyed,
Germany's liability in any case could not exceed the market value of
the whole ship including all interests in it which were impressed with
American nationality. In arriving at the market value of the whole
ship, it is a free ship that is valued, that is, no account is taken of the
independent value of any charter.
If the vessel destroyed was American-owned and under foreign
charter the effect upon the American interest depended upon whether
the charter rate was less or more than the current market hire. If less,
then the charter was an incumbrance on the ship, so that the American
owner's interest was less than if a free ship. If more, the charter was
an asset, so that the American owner owned more than a free ship. The
umpire thought, however, that in the latter case under the treaty
Germany's liability was only for the tangible thing, the free ship.

If the vessel destroyed was foreign-owned under American charter, and if the charter price was less than the current rate, the foreign
owner owned less than a free ship, and the di:ff erence was owned by the
American charterer. If the charter price was greater than the current
rate, the American charterer suffered no loss by the loss of the ship.
The steps in determining liability were first to ascertain the reasonable market value of a free ship, and next to compute the relative
interests in such amount of the owner and charterer.
If the ship was American-owned, Germany ordinarily had the burden of establishing the extent of the foreign interest. If the ship was
foreign-owned the burden was usqally on the claimant to prove the
60

May 12, 1925,

ADM.

DEc.

AND

OP. 308.
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amount of the incumbrance held because of ·the charter by an American national.61
The Mixed Arbitral Tribunals had no jurisdiction in cases where
ships were lost on the high sea, but only where ships had been seized
and retained in German ports. Loss of profits was an item of the claims
in the lat'.ter category. 62 Germany relied on the position which had been
taken up by the Reparation Commission. The defense was rejected. In
considering the meaning of Article 297 ( e) the tribunal derived assistance froin the wording of the last paragraph of Article 297 ( f):
"Through restitution in accordance with this Article, the price or the
amount of compensation :fixed by the application of paragraph ( e) will
be reduced by the actual value of the property restored, account being
taken of compensation in respect of loss of use or deterioration." 68
The scale which was applied is interesting:
(I) expectation of life of the p~rticular ship, having regard to the
work on which' it would have been employed;
( 2) Blue Book rates, i.e., those applicable to ships chartered by the
British Government, as long as likely in the Government's service;
(3) to be deducted according to estimates:
( aY cost of bunkers together with charges for trimming;
(b) wages and maintenance of crew;
(c) harbor and dock dues;
( d) cost of maintaining the ship in a condition to retain Lloyd's
and Board of Trade c<;rti:ficates;
( e) other items to keep the ship running ( for instance, wages of
the crew up to the date of its internment) ;
( 4) interest on each year's earnin~s;
It was held that it could not be taken into account that the ship
would have been insured and that the ship would quickly have been
replaced in the case of loss by another, purchased with the insurance
61
ADM. DEc. AND OP. 338, 709. See also various cases of chart~rs, id. at 715
et seq., and the Joint Statement of the Agento concerning the value of certain pri. vately owned vessels for the loss of which claim is made before the Mixed Claims
Comm., ADM. DEc. AND OP., Appendix p. VII (1927).
62
Owners of S. S. "Seaham Harbour," Denaby and Cadeby Main Collieries Ltd.,
Liverpool and Hamburg S. S. Co. Ltd., Limerick S. S. Co. Ltd. v. German Government, (Trib. Arb. Mixte anglo-allemand, i923 and 1924) 4 REcUEIL 27, 33, 34,
36.
.
68
Italics ,the writer's.
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moneys. This was deemed too remote. On the other hand, no amount
of premiums was included in the estimated expenditure.
MISCELLANEOUS CONSEQUENCE OF

wAR CLAIMS

Since the Mixed Claims Commission by the Agreement of August
1o, 1922, was directed to pass upon "Claims for loss or damage to
:which the United States or its nationals had been subjected with respect to injuries to persons, or to property, rights and interests, including any company or ·association in which American nationals are interested, since July 31, 1914, as a consequence of war," it can be imagined
that a wide variety of Americans attributed their expenses and losses
to the war and filed claims for reimbursement. There were claims for
increased wages paid to fulfil pre-war contracts, for expenses incurred
in providing additional guards and watchmen for factories, shipyards
and the like, for loss of business profits,64 for depreciation of the currency of European countries, for bankruptcy of foreign debtors as in
the Norse insurance case, already mentioned, for excessive freight
charges and for many other costs which directly or indirectly were alleged to be in "consequence of the war.''
Following the ·commission's Administrative Decisions I and II,
and the decision in the War Risk Insurance Preniium cases, the agents,
after agreeing to the facts, requested the commission to rule, among
others, upon the following cases:
( 1) For the seizure by the American Alien Property Custodian of
property belonging to the American claimant and for expenses in obtaining its release;' 65
( 2) For losses through inability to fulfil contracts for carrying
freight by sea, and for loss of part payment of purchase price of
schooner due to refusal of the United States Shipping Board to grant
licenses during the war to the schooner; 66
(3) For guarding the property of Globe Elevator C01.J?-pany and
for premiums for insurance against riot and civil commotion; 67
64 SCHATZEL, DAs DEuTScH-FRANzosISCHE GEMISCHTE ScHEIDEGERICHT, SEIN'E
GESCHICHTS, RECHSPRECHUNG UND ERGEBNISSE, UNIVERSITAT KIEL lNSTITUT FUR
lNTERNATIONALES RECHT ERSTE REIHE V ORTA.GE UND EINZELSCHRIFTEN HEFT I 2,
87 (1930) mentions a church in Colmar which filed a complaint for loss of profits because it was forbidden to ring church bells when members of the parish departed this
life. The earnings would have been especially advantageous in war time.
65 Docket No. 602, FIRST REPORT OF RoBERT W. BoNYNGE BEFORE THE MIXED
CLAIMS COMM., UNITED STA~S AND GERMANY 247 (1922).
66
Id. at 257, Docket No. 626.
67
Id. at 626, Docket No. 4582, Id. at 510, Docket No. 3969.
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( 4) For insurance premiums paid by steamship company for life
and property insurance for ·members of its crews, for extra wages, and
for the cost of installing safety devices; i;s
(5) For excess freight rates paid on foreign consignments; 69
( 6) For added costs of storage and fire insurance. 70
The colilITlission dismissed all of the foregoing and other similar
claims on the ground that the losses were due to the mere existence of.
war rather than to any act of Germany.
INTEREST

While it is sometimes said that interest will not be allowed against
a government either on the theory that the sovereign is presumed to
be ready to discharge its obligations, or that interest is a penalty and
the sovereign can do no wrong, 11 this rule, if it can be found to exist
at all, at present 'is one of municipal rather than international law. 12
International tribunals have customarily allowed interest in appropriate cases, although of course this is a matter which may be governed
specifically by the agreement creating the tribunal. 73 Interest may be
"compensatory," that is, "added to the money valuation of damages,
to fix the total amount of an indemnity" 74 or "moratory" that is,
payable on the amount awarded on account of delay in payment. The
principle of compensatory interest is sometimes applied where indemnification for loss of profits ought to be awarded but computation is
difficult. 75
As an illustration of the policy of an international tribunal on the
matter of interest, the following is a summary of the rules of the
Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany:
I. On American claims for losses wherever occurring based on
property taken or destroyed by Germany, during American neutrality,
interest at 5 per cent was charged from the date of actual loss.
2. On American claims for property taken by Germany in German
territory during belligerency and not returned, interest was charged
68

Id. at 511, Docket No. 3972.
Id. at 495, Docket No. 3940.
70 Id. at 428, Docket No. 2588. In connection with notes 65 to 70, see also
, BoNYNGE REPORT 27 (1934).
71
I SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES, 4th ed., 1039 (1916).
72
VI MooRE, DIGEST 1028 ( 1906).
73
III WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1913 (1943).
74
Russia v. Turkey, ScoTT, THE HAGUE REPORTS 295, 312 (1918).
75 See Fausto Mora & Aurelis Arango (U.S. v. Mexico) and Orinoco Asphalt Co.
(Germany v. Venezuela) referred to in III WHITEMAN, supra n. 73, 1930 (1943).
69
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at 5 per cent from the date of the loss, whether such loss occurred at or
after the taking.
3. On American claims for losses wherever occurring based on
property destroyed during belligerency and not replaced, and damaged
in consequence of hostilities, interest was charged at the rate of 5 per
cent from November II, I 9 I 8.
4. On American claims for losses during the whole war period
based on personal injuries or death and on claims during the period of
belligerency for maltreatment of prisoners, inhuman treatment of
civilians, forced labor, injuries to health or honor and damage to surviving dependents by injury or death to civilians, interest was not
considered in computing the award, but was allowed at the rate of 5
per cent from the date of the award.
5. In cases of damage but not destruction, taking and subsequent
returning and destruction with replacement, the commission awarded
interest or not as seemed just in the particular case. 76
An explicit rule was provided in the Treaty of Versailles with regard to countries which adopted the Clearing of Debts (Article 296). 11
The rate was 5 per cent except in cases where, by contract, law or custom the creditor was entitled to a different rate. Interest was to run
from the date the sum fell due until it was credited to the creditor's
Clearing Office. Compound interest was not allowed. The precedents
in respect of exceptional war measures were far from unanimous. Usually 5 per cent was awarded, 78 but at least in one case no award was
made. 79 The instant from which interest was to run was fixed somewhat
arbitrarily at the date of the sale,8° of the replacement,81 of the invest76

Administrative Decision III, ADM. DEc. AND OP. 61 at 6g (1923).
§ 22 Ann. to Sec. III of Part X.
78
Guy de Wendel v. Etat allemand, {Trib. Arb. Mixte franco-allemand, 1921)
1 REcUEIL 320; Gazet de Neck v. Etat allemand, {Trib. Arb. Mixte germano-belge,
1922) 2 RECUEIL 21; General Rouquerel v. Etat allemand, (Trib. Arb. Mixte
franco-allemand, 1922) 2 REcUEIL 42; Lieutenant-Colonel de Puymaigre v. Etat
allemand, {Trib. Arb. Mixte franco-allemand, l 922) 2 REcUEIL 1 11 ; Papeteries
d'Ensival et de Malmedy S. A. Etat allemand, {Trib. Arb. Mixte germano-belge,
1922) 2 REcUEIL 354 {5¼ per cent in accordance with the Belgian legal rate);
Claudius Ash, Sons and Co. Ltd., v. Etat autrichien, {Trib. Arb. Mixte angloautrichien, 1923) 3 RECUEIL 40; Borax Consolidated Ltd. v. Etat autrichien, {Trib.
Arb. Mixte anglo-autrichien, 1923) 3 REcUEIL 45.
.
79
Bernheim Freres v. Etat allemand, {Trib. Arb. Mixte franco-allemand, 1922)
2 RECUEIL 23.
80
Papeteries d' Ensival et de Malmedy S. A. Etat allemand, {Trib. Arb. Mixte
germano-belge, 1922) 2 REcUEIL 354, (1922).
81
Gaze! de Neck v. Etat allemand, (Trib. Arb. Mixte germano-belge, 1922)
2 RECUEIL 2 l.
77
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ment in Austrian War Loans,82 at an average date (July r, 1917),83
at December 31, 1918,84 or at the date of receipt of the claim on the
ground that the indemnity_ was to be equivalent to the replacement
value as of said date. 85
82
Claudius Ash, Sons and Co. Ltd., v. Etat autrichien, (Trib. Arb. Mixte angloautrichien, 1923) 3 RECUEIL 40; Borax Consolidated Ltd. v. Etat autrichien,
(Trib. Arb. Mixte anglo-autrichien, 1923) 3 REcUEIL 45.
88
General Rouquerel v. Etat allemand, (Trib. Arb. Mixte franco-allemand,
1922) 2 RECUEIL 42.
84 Lieutenant-Colonel de Puymaigre v. Etat allemand, (Trib. Arb. Mixte francoallemand, 1922) 2 RECUEIL III.
85 Guy de Wendel v. Etat allemand, (Trib. Arb. Mixte franco-allemand, 1921)
I R'ECUEIL 3 20.
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